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FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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Independence for Ghana

by David E. Apter

The rapid constitutional advance which has characterized Gold Coast political development in West Africa ended with the creation on March 6 of the new independent nation of Ghana, the name by which the Gold Coast will be known henceforth. March 6 is the anniversary of the Bond of 1844, an agreement in which certain Gold Coast chiefs accepted the principles of English justice and equity. This date will assume new significance now that the first all-African parliamentary democracy in sub-Saharan Africa has moved from colonial status to freedom.

Since the days of the Bond, which spoke of "moulding the customs of the country to the general principles of English law," parliamentary institutions have developed so that the Gold Coast as a unitary state has been able to achieve internal self-government with a cabinet system before the final attainment of sovereignty. A nation has been created out of diverse tribal and religious groupings—Fanti, Ga, Ashanti, Dagomba, Mamprussi, to name only a few.

Handicaps and obstacles have been difficult to overcome. Many still remain. Tribal parochialism shows a new burst of energy, chal-

lenging a popular majority in office whose devotion to politics does not always include devotion to chieftaincy and other hallowed institutions.

Ashanti, the powerful seat of a great confederacy which has long maintained its traditions of supremacy, has been the scene of a serious National Liberation Movement directed, not against the colonial tie, but against Kwame Nkrumah, the popularly elected prime minister and life chairman of the ruling Convention People's party (CPP). In the north tribal institutions remain largely intact; and fiercely conservative tribesmen, often Muslims, view the southern coastal peoples with a mixture of fear and contempt. Erstwhile nationalists, some of whom were once powerful figures in Nkrumah's entourage, have recently led a fight against independence. Their petitions having been denied by the British Parliament, they then sought the secession of Ashanti and the Northern Territories on independence day. Thus the Gold Coast, as it achieves nationhood, is a place of trouble and uncertainty, mixed with jubilation and great excitement.

For the thousands of Nkrumah's followers this is both an end and a beginning. It is an

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end to the struggle which began with the launching of "Positive Action" for self-government in 1950 and the birth of a radical mass party which took nationalism away from conservative and educated lawyers and professional men and placed it in the hands of a mass political party. It saw Nkrumah, a graduate of Lincoln University in Pennsylvania, taken from jail to be made first Gold Coast prime minister in the first cabinet government in West Africa.

Most noteworthy, perhaps, in the interim period between 1950 and independence day, was the degree of judgment and of cooperation with British civil servants exercised by nationalists as the struggle for independence was widened to overcome political inexperience, administrative inadequacy, and economic problems like the swollen shoot disease which threatened to destroy the cocoa crop of the Gold Coast, the country's major source of revenue. But it is a beginning in the sense that now the newly independent government must, on its own, solve the problems that remain.

Ghana's Prime Minister

Kwame Nkrumah, the prime minister, is an interesting and complex figure. He has been organization-minded from the moment he took over active leadership of the nationalist movement in 1949. His Convention People's party established rural and municipal branches all over the Gold Coast. He himself has said that his first loyalty is to the party. Opponents of Nkrumah argue that he

is basically a believer in one-party rule and that the whole paraphernalia of Western-type government developed in collaboration with the British Colonial Service was simply a tactical means to gain independence for the Gold Coast in order to perpetuate his own power.

There was a time when Nkrumah as a personality was a symbol of Gold Coast nationalism. Today he is less so as party discipline, use of the parliamentary system, attacks on chieftaincy, and the process of sloughing off party malcontents have swelled the ranks of an opposition whose commitments are more to chieftaincy, regionalism and tribal integrity under the framework of a federal system rather than to a unitary state. A certain degree of popular "disenchantment" attaches to Nkrumah at the moment of his greatest triumph.

While Nkrumah is a man with a mission, he has had a sense of accomplishment for several years. The goal of British policy—to give the Gold Coast self-government—has been clear ever since the CPP came to office. He has been careful, therefore, to make use of the last years of British rule to ensure continuity and administrative strength following achievement of self-government. Former Colonial Service personnel, many of them in the most senior government posts, will continue in office as part of the Gold Coast Civil Service. A separate Civil Service Board will remain responsible to a governor-general.

During the past few years the achievements in the field of educa-

tion have been enormous, with many first-rate civil servants being turned out by the University College of the Gold Coast. One of the first efforts of the Nkrumah government was to ensure as wide a degree of public primary and secondary education as possible, and there has been a remarkable expansion of educational facilities. Hence the prospects for recruitment to government posts will improve as time goes on.

Economic Prospects

Economic development designed to reduce the Gold Coast's dependence on a single crop, cocoa, has been given considerable impetus by the Nkrumah government. Plans for damming the Volta River to produce electricity for light industry, to irrigate the Accra plains—a potentially rich farming area—and to produce aluminum with local bauxite have shown both imagination and soberness. Port facilities have been widened, railway lines have been extended, and attention has been paid to the sociological consequences of the resulting changes. The impact of economic development on the growth of urban areas has been studied, and so have the secondary facilities which must be created in response to economic change. These are all major achievements of the Nkrumah regime.

...Nor has the opposition been denied a voice in decision-making processes. It is true that under the unicameral single-member representative system tribalism is given no

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How Much Trade — How Much Aid?

Trade and aid programs are not the biggest issues on the horizon of the United States, but they are among the more controversial and may provide some of the more spectacular fireworks in this session of Congress.

These programs become bones of contention in Congress for exactly opposite reasons. Trade is a highly provocative issue because it represents many conflicting components, many localized pressures: manufacturers wanting foreign markets, industries wanting tariff protection, farmers wanting markets for their surpluses, producers wanting preferences for their products. Foreign aid, however, is controversial because it has no grass-roots backers, yet seems necessary for national security reasons. The Administration wants continuance of aid as a matter of policy—foreign policy; but to Congressmen it is money out of the pockets of their constituents. Its recipients do not have any votes in the United States, as do the beneficiaries of either liberal trade policies or tariff protection.

The Administration has at least some domestic allies fighting for trade expansion and tariff reduction; in battling for aid it has only foreign allies, except when it defends its requests as a matter of national security, military efficiency, enlightened self-interest. And it is the people with the votes who carry weight in Congress. A Congress that is out to cut expenses, to trim the budget (and this Congress certainly is), will trim where it hurts the least or where the hurt is smaller temporarily.

Trade and aid are, of course, related; both directly affect United States relations with other powers.

But trade is no substitute for aid—and aid is certainly no substitute for trade. United States trade policy calls for lowering barriers and increasing volume because this country builds and grows more than it can consume at home and because ingenuity and two world wars have made it a creditor, not a debtor, country. United States aid policy calls for furnishing military and economic help to many countries round the world as a pure matter of self-preservation. Aid has philanthropic overtones; it can be pictured as charity. But the plain fact is that only one-tenth of our aid is economic—the rest is military. Its purpose is to “contain” the U.S.S.R.—or to put it in reverse, to preserve the free world. We are destined to have trade and aid programs indefinitely—although time and events will reshape them constantly.

At the moment we are in the midst of one of the biggest investigations into foreign aid—or, as the Administration prefers to call it, mutual assistance—since the Marshall Plan.

Issues at Stake

There is a lot of investigation going on into both trade and aid—but particularly aid. The Administration has set up its own study group headed by Benjamin F. Fairless, which on March 5 declared the United States “should hold firmly” to foreign aid outlays. Congress has committees looking into “mutual security.” Scholars, such as Professors Max F. Millikan and W. W. Rostow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, have made extensive and provocative studies of the subject. Leading laymen, notably Eric

A. Johnston and Paul G. Hoffman, have some strong views on foreign aid. The Twentieth Century Fund, the Brookings Institution, the Foreign Policy Association and other organizations have published studies, both scholarly and popular, on the subject.

There is also the question whether the United States should conduct its foreign aid through the United Nations—or on a bilateral basis. The UN is considering a major project called SUNFED (Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development) which would have the UN members create a huge fund for the use of underdeveloped countries—with the United States making its foreign economic aid contributions primarily through this agency. However, the United States still holds to the view that it should deal directly with recipients of American aid rather than entirely through the UN, although at present there is greater support here for aid through the UN than in the past.

In its trade program the Administration is still battling for United States membership in the Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC), the organization which would administer and act as central clearinghouse of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the basis of our trade relations. But the problems of “peril points,” “escape clause,” and “national security” still represent formidable obstacles to actual tariff reductions. In spite of this, tariff barriers are going down and international trade is increasing.

NEAL STANFORD

(The last in a series of eight articles on “Decisions . . . 1957,” a comprehensive review of American foreign policy.)



Can Nations Be Moral?

The Suez crisis and the Hungarian revolt have set off the most earnest and penetrating debate since World War II about morality among nations.

The roster of case histories under discussion is already long: Britain and France at Suez; Israel and Egypt in the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba; the U.S.S.R.—specifically in Hungary, but generally for Communist intervention in other countries; Britain in Cyprus; France in Algeria; India and Pakistan in Kashmir. Who is the wrong-doer? who the victim? And if both can be identified, what can or should the world community do to punish the one and succor the other?

In each instance, with the possible exception of the U.S.S.R., issues which at first sight seem clear become blurred, as the debate goes on, by the complexity of the facts presented and by controversy about the value of judgments which, when passed, may not be implemented or if implemented, may only create new and perhaps more dangerous international conflicts. So as case follows case in the forum of the United Nations General Assembly the prevailing tendency is to avoid decisions, to propose new investigations, further negotiations—with the hope that time and patience will eventually reduce tensions, dissolve suspicions, foster workable compromises.

To many onlookers in the United States and in other member countries of the UN this process of discussion without decision often seems not only tedious but basically lacking in moral values. Is there, some people ask, no such thing as morality among nations? Should we, others inquire,

tolerate a double standard of morality—one of resigned acquiescence in the case of great powers, and another of harsh enforcement in the case of the small and weak? Must we be more ruthless with Israel because it is a religious-minded democracy than with Egypt, a dictatorship, or the U.S.S.R., whose atheism precludes appeals on moral grounds?

Have the Afro-Asian nations—and particularly a frequent spokesman on their behalf, India's Prime Minister Nehru—the right to assume a "holier-than-thou" attitude about Algeria or Portuguese colonies in Africa yet be lukewarm in the case of Hungary or, to take India, resist UN action on Kashmir? Or are the Afro-Asian nations, for their part, right when they ask why the Western powers, deeply distressed over Hungary, seem surprisingly calm about the killing of 18,000 Muslims by the French in Algeria in 1956. Is morality, say some of the Afro-Asians, a matter of race and color? Have not the colonial powers in the past enforced a double standard of morality—and don't they do it even now where their writ still runs?

Debate Without Decision

This debate, which cuts across the lines of existing great-power blocs, is poignantly reminiscent of the debate that only a decade ago rent asunder nations, as well as individual consciences, in Nazi-occupied Europe—particularly in France, already divided before Hitler's invasion. Surely it is not a coincidence but a testimony to the central preoccupation of our times that three plays dealing with man's responsibility for man—and for nations—during the French

Resistance should have been on the boards this winter in New York—Charles Morgan's *The River Line*, the Goetz dramatization of Storm Jameson's novel, *The Hidden River*, and Salacrou's *Nuits de Colère*, presented by the Renaud-Barrault Company; or that Albert Camus once again wrestles with this issue in his soliloquy-novel, *The Fall*, just published by Knopf.

In these plays, in this novel, we have the same theme as in the UN debates: What is morality? Is it merely a matter of decision for the individual, with such consequences as it may bring for him, or is there a larger, public morality—of the nation, as in wartime France, or on a still broader plane, of the international community? Must individuals—and nations—be held accountable for their actions, no matter what their motives, and either be punished or exonerated in accordance with an accepted code of conduct?

This is the crux of the problem. Before there can be a judgment to enforce, there must be a consensus as to what is to be judged as right or wrong. There was no such consensus in wartime France. As Camus puts it, symbolically describing the *Zuider Zee*, "... there's no saying where it begins or ends. So we are steaming along without any landmark; we can't gauge our speed. ... It's not navigation but dreaming."

Similarly, as yet there is no consensus in the international community. And a consensus will obviously be much more difficult to achieve in a community of more than 2.4 billion people varying widely in traditions, religions, economic and social devel-

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Three Views on Israel

Lessing J. Rosenwald, chairman of the board of the American Council for Judaism, in a speech at a meeting of the New York City Chapter of the council, February 13, 1957 (excerpted from the council text):

THE impressions one obtains in Israel are very mixed. On the one hand it *has* offered a haven of refuge for hundreds of thousands who could not have found such a place in any other part of the world. Here they have a country which they consider "home" regardless of their nativity. Here they are free to work out their own destiny—often against unbelievable odds—where they have a sense of security despite the fact that their little country is surrounded on three sides by hostile people (and the sea on the fourth).

Marvels Accomplished

Here they are willing to make *any* sacrifice to maintain their independence and demonstrate constantly their determination to exist, succeed and flourish. This passion (and it is no less) has accomplished marvels. The economy, on the surface, appears to be expanding, and no one is starving; and no one need go without shelter—meager as it is sometimes. Children seem gay, youth determined and willing to take the most hazardous risks, and adults find a serenity, companionship and pride in achievement. No problem is too difficult to solve (except one) if the "homeland" requires it. People are courteous to each other and hospitable in the extreme to strangers. The "newcomers" are accepted as a

responsibility but not too willingly, and often as inferiors to the early settlers and the *sabras*. Nevertheless, in time they find their niche, shoulder their burdens—as do others—and in one way or another finally become integrated into the state.

Israel's 'Isolationism'

On the other hand, one sees the "isolationism" of Israel. For them the world is the boundaries of the Israeli borders. I found it difficult to explain how one could be enthusiastic about the state and disagree with Zionist ideology. To them, Jews who are in other parts of the world and who are in difficulty should receive no assistance other than to help them come to Israel—all else is temporizing. It is difficult for them to conceive how a Jew can live a normal life, be free and independent, outside of Israel. I do not think they can understand how I, a Jew, can love the United States as they do Israel. They cannot understand a Jew integrating himself into the fabric of any nation other than Israel.

While a great majority of the Israeli citizens were targets for oppression in other lands, they are more or less indifferent to the terrible situation in which the Arab refugees find themselves. They have expropriated their lands with little thought of the deprivations of those "displaced" Arabs. While Israel obtained reparations from Germany for expropriated property, I wonder what its attitude will be when it comes to making recompense to the "displaced" Arabs. Surely the difference is not too dissimilar. Even in

The far-reaching debate in the United Nations General Assembly and in the United States Congress about the pros and cons of UN sanctions against Israel brought forth a wide range of views. The FPA is reproducing here the views on Israel of three prominent Americans. For still another view, see Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein, "What Kind of Peace Settlement for Middle East?" FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN, December 15, 1956.

Israel the Arab citizens—those who remained on their own property and in their own villages—are not identical to Jewish citizens. They are, despite all arguments to the contrary, not first-class citizens.

The Jewish state is in itself an anomaly. In the first place a substantial portion are not Jews. Within Judaism it runs the gamut of intense Orthodox observance to an almost complete agnosticism. Generally speaking one can say that in Israel the people have little regard for religion. This is not meant to belittle the religious life—some take it very seriously—but most have little use for it.

Zionism itself has many shades of meaning. To the pious it is a deeply religious faith. To Mr. Ben-Gurion a Zionist is only one who will come to Israel and become an Israeli citizen in fact. In the United States of America it is a movement which is thoroughly devoted to Israel, willing to go to great extremes in its behalf, but has no intention of leaving the U.S.A. At any rate they all consider Israel as the focal point of their attention and devotion, and the *galut* and the "ingathering of the exiles" (either for themselves or, on occasion, for others) is still the underlying precept of their ideology. Zionism (other than religious) is purely a nationalistic movement even though it may sometimes have additional attributes.

Chauvinism is extreme in Israel—as explained before. It is natural. But there is a complete lack of understanding and acceptance of chauvinism in other countries. In Israel it is beneficial and proper—elsewhere

it is sinister, baseless and foolish. This attitude makes it extremely difficult to reach a *rapprochement* with other states—and specifically with the Arab states. In my opening paragraph I mentioned that all problems are soluble in Israel, except one. In Israel the word heard more frequently than any other is *Shalom* ("Peace"). By some strange quirk this one word is the attribute and the problem which fails to awaken passionate support.

Their attitude toward their most pressing and most important problem can only be described as apathetic. Everyone would like to see it come about, and all know of the desirable effect it would ultimately have on the entire economy. But they appear to regard this necessity as something only attainable in the dim future and that it will be brought about in some way in due course. I found no one (literally) who approached the problem with the zeal of furnishing a home for the oppressed, [of] the financing of their many difficult and expensive goals. Everything else was attacked with vigor and zeal. Peace was an indefinable, unobtainable objective for the present. In this particular attitude I found the most tragic anomaly in Israel.

Former President Harry S. Truman, in a speech at a dinner of the national conference of the Israel Bond Organization, Miami Beach, Florida, February 16, 1957 (excerpted from text in The New York Times, February 17, 1957):

THE present situation is dark and full of peril. Although the Eisenhower Mideast plan at long last is a beginning, it is too little and too late. Its chances of solving the problem by itself are very limited. It is clearly an emergency reaction to a danger that has grown from small beginnings

and spread, without effective counter-measures on our part, until that danger is now of the most threatening proportions.

No matter how firmly we may assert our determination to resist open Communist aggression in the area, no matter how loudly we may challenge the Soviets, we can be sure of one thing: The Communists will keep up their subversive intrigues and their arms shipments so long as there is tension in the Middle East, and so long as relations between Israel and the Arab states are based on suspicion and violence. We won't get anywhere with this Middle East situation unless we go to the root of the trouble.

The present strategy of the Administration seems to be to leave all these key matters to the United Nations to work out. But the United Nations is only as strong as its members, and only as wise as the policies which its members urge it to adopt. We are one of its members and should be the leader of the free world.

We cannot hide behind the skirts of the United Nations, or duck the responsibility of having some policy of our own for the settlement of the conflicts in the Middle East.

UN Must Be Fair

Furthermore, the solutions or settlements proposed by the United Nations must be fair to all sides. Nations, like householders, are entitled to protection against bandits and thugs. If they do not get such protection from the United Nations, they will have to do what they can to provide it for themselves. No government can survive if it allows its citizens to be murdered by wandering gangs of commandos, or permits its ports to be illegally blockaded. And unless the United Nations can protect Israel from such wrongs it is

not morally justified in asking Israel to give up the means of protecting itself from them.

An unfair settlement that does not in fact establish justice will not be effective. Even if it is accepted temporarily, the same old trouble will blaze out again, and things will then be worse than before.

The time is long overdue for our government to adopt a clear and vigorous policy in the Middle East—to use its influence and power to bring peace, to make known where it stands, and above all to work together with its friends and allies.

Zion Place of Peace

In spite of the dangers of the present, Israel will survive, as it did of old. Zion will again be a place of peace. The survival of Israel has always been a matter of faith—of the faith that moves mountains. From the days of the Hebrew prophets to our own, Israel has been faithful to its beliefs and to its covenant with God.

The creation of the state of Israel has been a miracle of modern times. We in this fortunate and prosperous country of the United States can never be indifferent to its fate. And we as citizens must do all in our power to correct the mistakes and blundering of our own government.

We must hold our elected leaders, by the force of public opinion, to the only course of conduct that can preserve peace in the Middle East and save Israel from destruction.

This will avert a major disaster in the Middle East which could easily bring on World War III. Let us put forth every effort possible to preserve the peace in the Middle East and pray that World War III will never come.

Senator William F. Knowland, Republican of California. Excerpted

from his address, "The United States and the United Nations," at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., February 11, 1957:

THERE are five major defects in the functioning of the United Nations. If not corrected now any one of them could result in the United Nations going the way of the League of Nations. These are (1) the abuse of the veto power by the Soviet Union; (2) a growing "double standard" of international morality; (3) the increasing trend to bloc voting; (4) an expanding tendency to interfere in the internal affairs of member nations; (5) unwillingness of many of the 80 members to equitably share the monetary costs and other obligations of the United Nations and its related activities while insisting on a full and equal voice in the making of decisions, the burdens of which must be assumed by others.

Double Moral Standard

[The] second weakness stems in part from the first—the Soviet abuse of the veto power. But even without the veto this defect might still exist, being based on a fear of Soviet power or an attempt of the neutralists to play both ends against the middle.

The Afro-Asian bloc voted for prompt action against the British, French and Israeli aggression in Egypt and time after time abstained from voting on the several resolutions relative to Soviet aggression against the people of Hungary.

Even now they are urging sanctions against Israel, which has at least partially complied with the United Nations resolution to withdraw from Egypt, while they remain silent on the Soviet refusal to pay the slightest attention to the Hungarian resolutions.

Is the United Nations to condone

a doctrine of "Might makes right"? Are the processes of the United Nations to be applicable to the free nations and not to the dictatorships? To the small and not to the large? To Israel because Gaza is not evacuated but not India or the U.S.S.R. because Kashmir and Hungary are not evacuated?

As I see it, our policy in regard to the United Nations should make it

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clear:

(1) That our foreign policy is an American policy and is not and will not be tied as a tail to a United Nations kite.

(2) The United Nations cannot take a moral leadership in the world unless the Soviet Union veto can be limited to those matters which impinge on its sovereignty and not those where the Soviet Union is violating the sovereignty of others. Hence, we should not compromise our moral leadership by diluting it with a Communist lack of international morality.

(3) On the basis of its record to date, no free nation, including our

own, dare risk its security on the United Nations' ability to function effectively.

(4) As an international forum for debate and discussion, it has a real value, but a substantial question remains as to whether this limited value is worth the price.

(5) If the United Nations is to be saved for use as an effective agency for collective security, steps must be taken to remedy its defects now, not a year from now or ten years hence.

Spotlight

(Continued from page 100)

opment and political experience than it was within a homogeneous nation like France. There are but few landmarks in the vast sea the UN charts as it navigates—and many hidden shoals. The law of nations, valuable so far as it goes, is still fragmentary. What there is of it is not always observed even by the most law-abiding great powers. How else explain the reluctance of the United States, Britain and France, before 1956, to challenge Egypt's closure of Suez to Israeli ships or assert the right of "innocent passage" through the Gulf of Aqaba?

Nor can such law as is observed always be enforced as it could be in a sovereign nation, since the members of the UN are not yet ready to delegate some of their sovereignty to the world organization. And nations, like individuals, are animated by motives which can only infrequently be described as selfless. They feel it is a matter of survival to assert what they regard as their national interests, and regard their interests as moral, even if the interests similarly defended by other nations, where these clash with their own, appear to them immoral.

Yet, slow as the pace of advance may seem to the impatient who would pull down the house because it is not being built fast enough, the

nations composing the world community are moving toward a consensus, a majority opinion of mankind, as to what are just or unjust actions in world affairs. Only when the foundations have been thus laid, can we hope to see the emergence of morality among nations.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

Apter

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recorded place. This may be a fault grave enough to prejudice the success of the entire parliamentary superstructure. Nkrumah and the CPP have attacked chieftaincy as a stronghold of reaction and, indeed, corruption. The chiefs have retorted with countercharges of their own about corruption among government officials.

In the general election called by Nkrumah last July, however, the CPP received a high degree of popular support—even in Ashanti, where for several months ministers of the CPP government thought it safer not to enter—winning 57 percent of the total number of votes. Yet chieftaincy evokes powerful responses, particularly among the rural public, which has not been as close to European contacts as the population of the coastal areas of the Gold Coast.

In the four major regions of the Gold Coast, territorial assemblies, which are largely composed of houses

of chiefs, can advise the government on policy but have few formal powers. Those who wish to keep the chiefs outside normal politics argue that they are primarily religious figures and must remain apart from the formal structure of a secular system of government. Others contend that the complex structure of consultation, representation and adjudication involved in chieftaincy still represents the heart of Gold Coast society and that to deny it to the people is to deny true representation and democracy. The patterns of elections and parliamentary government, it is said, are a façade for the ordinary citizen of Ghana, whose life, habits, rituals, land ownership and sense of identity remain rooted in tradition.

With the formation of Ghana the struggle for independence is over. But the intense anguish involved when people are fundamentally divided over matters of basic belief will persist. It is an axiom of democratic government that some degree of consensus is required before parliamentary institutions can truly function. It is up to Ghana to demonstrate to the world and to other African territories that a house divided can still stand, and that diversity and unity can be reconciled within the framework of a single nation.

Dr. Apter, assistant professor of political science, now at Northwestern University but about to join the faculty of the Univer-

sity of Chicago, was in the Gold Coast in 1952-53 under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council. He is the author of *Gold Coast in Transition* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1955), and is currently writing a book on Uganda.

FPA Bookshelf

BOOKS ON THE UN

The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., has published two volumes in its United Nations series which should be of great value to every student of international organization: *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security*, by Leland M. Goodrich, professor of international organization and administration at Columbia University, and Anne P. Simons, formerly of the UN Secretariat, which examines the methods and processes used to maintain peace and security through the UN; and *Proposals for Changes in the United Nations*, by Francis O. Wilcox and Carl M. Marcy, chief-of-staff and consultant, respectively, for the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, at the time they wrote this volume, which weighs the pros and cons of suggestions for revision or review of various features of the UN. The price of the first is \$6.00, that of the second, \$5.00.

The Yearbook of the United Nations, 1955 (New York, Columbia University Press, in cooperation with the United Nations, 1956, \$10.50) is the ninth annual edition produced by the United Nations Department of Public Information. It provides a comprehensive account of the year's work of the UN and its specialized agencies. The book also contains many useful maps and charts, and background information on the structure of the UN.

To supplement this factual reference book is the valuable *Annual Review of United Nations Affairs 1955-1956*, edited by Clyde Eagleton and Richard N. Swift (New York, New York University Press, 1957, \$4.50). It is the seventh in a series but differs from the first five in that it is now an analysis and an evaluation of the year's items the authors consider of greatest permanent significance, instead of a collection of speeches made at the Institute for Annual Review of United Nations Affairs.

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